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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKee, Circuit Judge 
 
 According to its website, the University of Northern 
New Jersey “was founded in 2012 after several years of 
witnessing the challenges inexperienced graduates face in a 
diverse and global job market.”1 It was purportedly “nationally 
accredited by the Accrediting Commission of Career Schools 
and Colleges and the Commission on English Language 
Accreditation” and “certified by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Student and Exchange Visitor Program to 
educate international students.”2 The site listed the President as 
Dr. Steven Brunetti, Ph.D., and included a message from Dr. 
                                              
1 History of UNNJ, UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN NEW JERSEY, 
https://web.archive.org 
/web/20160312141506/http://www.unnj.edu/history-of-unnj 
(last visited July 19, 2019). 
2 Id. 
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Brunetti touting the school’s dedication “to providing a high-
quality American education to the domestic and international 
academic community.”3 The school’s social media accounts 
even informed students when UNNJ closed for inclement 
weather and posted wedding pictures after two of the school’s 
alumni were purportedly married.4 
 
 But the University never existed. Neither did Dr. 
Brunetti or the newlywed “alumni.” The Department of 
Homeland Security created UNNJ as a “sham university” as 
part of a scheme to catch brokers of fraudulent student visas. 
The plan worked, in a manner of speaking. It did catch many 
brokers of fraudulent student visas. It also ensnared hundreds 
of foreign students who had “enrolled” in UNNJ.  The 
Government initially conceded that those students were 
innocent victims of the fraud, but later tried to change that 
characterization to suggest that they were more akin to 
participants in the fraudulent scheme.5 When DHS’s 
investigation into the fraudulent visa scheme concluded, each 
enrolled student—including the plaintiffs here—received a 
letter informing them that their student status “ha[d] been set 
to Terminated due to [their] fraudulent enrollment” in UNNJ.6 
The import of that letter underlies this appeal. 
                                              
3Office of the President, UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN NEW 
JERSEY, https://web.archive.org 
web/20160307134201/http://www.unnj.edu/office-of-the-
president/ (last visited July 19, 2019).   
4 See, e.g., @UNorthernNJ, TWITTER (Feb 2, 2015, 5:45 
AM), https://twitter.com/ 
UNorthernNJ/status/562245302401634304 (last visited July 
19, 2019) (“UNNJ will be closed today due to weather. This 
includes all classes, administrative offices, and 
clubs/activities. Thank you, Dr. B”). 
5 As we explain below, at oral argument the Government 
conceded that these students were the innocent victims of 
fraud who had been unknowingly ensnared in the sting set for 
individuals who profited from such students by charging for 
arranging fraudulent student visas. Later, for reasons known 
only to the Government, and as we elaborate below, it 
contradicted that position by a subsequent statement 
“clarifying” it.  
6 App. 49. 
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The Government sent the letter after filing charges 
against twenty-one individuals for fraudulently procuring 
visas.  The letter terminated the plaintiffs’ student visas and the 
plaintiffs thereafter filed this class action alleging violations of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, their Due Process rights, 
and alleging the Government should be estopped from 
revoking their visas.  The District Court dismissed the claims 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and because no final 
action had been taken by the Government. The District Court 
concluded that there was no final Government action because 
reinstatement proceedings could still provide administrative 
relief.  The Court also found that the case was not ripe for 
review. We disagree with the District Court’s conclusion as to 
both grounds and will therefore vacate the order dismissing 
these claims and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. BACKGROUND   
A. The F-1 Visa Program  
 
“Nonimmigrant students,” such as the plaintiffs, may 
lawfully obtain an F-1 visa and reside in the United States 
while enrolled at Government-approved schools.7  
Immigration and Customs Enforcement administers the F-1 
visa system, which governs nonimmigrant students’ legal 
status, through its Student and Exchange Visitor Program 
(“SEVP”). Each school that educates F-1 students has a 
Designated School Official (“DSO”) who monitors, advises, 
and oversees the students attending his or her institution.8 
When ICE determines that a school’s participation in the SEVP 
should be withdrawn, it provides notice to the school and an 
opportunity for it to contest the intended termination.9  
 
Students who enter the United States with F-1 visas are 
subject to an array of regulations.10 These include maintaining 
a full course of study11 or participating in an authorized 
                                              
7 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F). 
8 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.3. 
9 Id.  § 214.4(b). 
10 Id. § 214.2(f). 
11 Id. § 214.2(f)(6). 
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“practical training” role following the completion of studies.12 
There are two types of practical training programs.13 Curricular 
Practical Training (“CPT”) is any “alternative work/study, 
internship, cooperative education, or any other type of required 
internship or practicum that is offered by sponsoring 
employers through cooperative agreements with the school” 
that is an “integral part of an established curriculum.”14 The 
other is Optional Practical Training (“OPT”) which consists of 
temporary employment that is “directly related to the student’s 
major area of study.”15 
 
Once a student has completed his or her course of study 
and any accompanying practical training, he or she has sixty 
days to either depart the United States or transfer to another 
accredited academic institution and seek a transfer of the F-1 
visa.16 If a student voluntarily withdraws from the F-1 
program, he or she has fifteen days to leave the United States.17 
A student who “fails to maintain a full course of study without 
the approval of the DSO or otherwise fails to maintain status” 
must depart the United States immediately or seek 
reinstatement.18  
 
Under the reinstatement regulations, a district director 
in the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) 
“may consider” reinstating a student who demonstrates that he 
or she: 1) “has not been out of [valid F-1] status for more than 
5 months at the time of filing the request for reinstatement” or 
that “the failure to file within the 5 month period was the result 
of exceptional circumstances and that the student filed the 
request for reinstatement as promptly as possible under these 
exceptional circumstances;” 2) does “not have a record of 
repeated or willful violations of Service regulations”; 3) is 
pursuing or intends to pursue a full course of study; 4) has not 
engaged in unauthorized employment; 5) is not deportable on 
                                              
12 Id. § 214.2(f)(10)(i). 
13 Id. § 214.2(f)(10)(ii). 
14 Id. § 214.2(f)(1)(i). 
15 Id. § 214.2(f)(1)(ii). 
16 Id. § 214.2(f)(5)(iv). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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any ground other than 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) and (C)(i);19 
and 6) can prove that the violation of status resulted from 
circumstances beyond the student’s control, or that the 
violation relates to a reduction in the student’s course load that 
would have otherwise been permitted if authorized by the 
school and that failure to approve reinstatement would result 
in extreme hardship to the student.20 The USCIS’s decision to 
reinstate is discretionary. If the USCIS “does not reinstate the 
student, the student may not appeal that decision.”21  
 
Separately, the Code of Federal Regulations permits 
termination of a student’s F-1 visa status in three ways: 1) by 
revoking a waiver that the Attorney General had previously 
authorized under § 212(d)(3) or (4) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act; 2) “by the introduction of a private bill to 
confer permanent resident status,” or 3) “pursuant to 
notification in the Federal Register, on the basis of national 
security, diplomatic, or public safety reasons.”22 Purported 
“fraudulent enrollment” in an institution is not a statutorily 
authorized reason for terminating a student’s F-1 visa status.23  
B. The “University of Northern New Jersey” 
 
In 2013, ICE created the University of Northern New 
Jersey and situated it in Cranford, New Jersey.24 ICE’s goal 
was to target academic recruiters and brokers who charged 
foreign students a fee to place them into universities that did 
not actually offer the course of study or authorized practical 
                                              
19 Section 1227(a)(1)(B) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code classifies 
an individual as a deportable alien if his or her nonimmigrant 
visa (such as an F-1 student visa) has been revoked. Section 
1227(C)(i) applies to an “alien who was admitted as a 
nonimmigrant and who has failed to maintain the 
nonimmigrant status in which the alien was admitted.” 
20 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(16)(i)(A)–(F). 
21 Id. § 214.2(f)(16)(ii). 
22 Id. § 214.1(d). 
23 Nonimmigrant visas may also be revoked at any time at the 
discretion of a “consular officer or the Secretary of State.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1201(i). That mechanism of revocation is also 
inapplicable to this appeal. 
24 Br. for Appellee, 12. 
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training required to satisfy the F-1 visa requirements. As is 
apparent from what we said at the outset, for all outward 
appearances, UNNJ looked like a real university. It was 
accredited by the State of New Jersey. DHS listed UNNJ on its 
website of approved institutions. UNNJ maintained a detailed 
website and active social media accounts. The website outlined 
admissions criteria, explained the academic programs that the 
school offered (including seven undergraduate majors and nine 
graduate programs), and assured students that various support 
systems including tutoring sessions and advisory services were 
available.25  
 
By the time UNNJ “closed” in April of 2016, DHS’s 
sting operation yielded twenty-two arrests relating to the 
brokerage of fraudulent visas. At that same time, more than 500 
students had ostensibly “enrolled” in UNNJ. The closure of the 
university prompted DHS to inform those students that their 
valid F-1 status had been terminated. DHS did so in a letter sent 
to students that stated, in relevant part: 
This letter is to inform you that 
your SEVIS record and your Form 
I-20, SEVIS [Identification 
Number], issued by University of 
Northern New Jersey, school code 
NEW214F32011000, has been set 
to Terminated status due to your 
                                              
25 UNNJ’s website also included multiple appeals to 
international students. For example, its “History” page noted 
explicitly that it was certified by DHS to “educate 
international students.” History of UNNJ, UNIVERSITY OF 
NORTHERN NEW JERSEY, https://web.archive 
.org/web/20160312141506/http://www.unnj.edu/history-of-
unnj (last visited July 19, 2019). Its admissions page stated 
that incoming students would “meet countless other students 
from around the world” and included special instructions for 
“[i]nternational applicants seeking F-1 visa status.” 
Admissions, UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN NEW JERSEY, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160326211937/http://www.un
nj.edu/admissions (last visited July 19, 2019). Indeed, the 
only thing lacking appears to be reference to UNNJ’s men’s 
or women’s basketball team in the Final Four of the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association’s basketball tournament.   
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fraudulent enrollment in the 
above school.  
 
Since your SEVIS record has been 
Terminated you no longer have 
valid F-1 nonimmigrant status and 
must either file for reinstatement 
of your nonimmigrant student 
status with U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) or 
depart the United States 
immediately.  
 
For instructions on how to file for 
a reinstatement, visit 
www.uscis.gov. Transfer requests 
will not be authorized unless you 
have been approved for 
reinstatement by USCIS.26 
 
C. The Student Plaintiffs and The Current Litigation  
 
The named plaintiffs are five students whose visas were 
cancelled following the closure of UNNJ. They filed the 
putative class action complaint that gave rise to this appeal on 
behalf of themselves and hundreds of other similarly situated 
students.27 The complaint 1) alleged that the Government’s 
termination of their lawful immigration status was a violation 
of Due Process and was arbitrary and capricious under the 
Administrative Procedure Act,28 and 2) sought an order 
prohibiting the Government from finding that the students 
committed fraud by enrolling in UNNJ.  
 
The Government moved to dismiss the complaint under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
It argued that ICE’s determination did not qualify as a final 
agency action and that the case was not ripe for review. The 
                                              
26 App. 49 (emphasis added). 
27 We take no position on whether this suit will ultimately be 
amenable to class disposition. 
28 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. 
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District Court granted the motion on both grounds.29 It first 
concluded that ICE’s decision to terminate the students’ F-1 
status was not a final agency action “because their applications 
for reinstatement [were] still pending.”30 It explained that the 
“initial decision of terminating Plaintiffs’ visas cannot be seen 
as ‘final’ given that ICE is currently in the process of deciding 
if Plaintiffs are entitled to reinstatement of their visas.”31 It 
found that the termination decision was “more akin to the 
beginning of an administrative proceeding than enacting a final 
action.”32 
 
Second, the District Court concluded that the issues 
were not ripe for review because the students were “seeking 
the same determination—whether their enrollments were 
fraudulent—that they [were] already seeking from their 
pending applications.”33 It also found that the record was 
incomplete because of ongoing ICE proceedings, and that 
“immediate hardship cannot be shown because the 
administrative proceeding will likely be resolved in the coming 
months without any action needed from this Court.”34  
 
The District Court entered an order dismissing the case. 
This appeal followed. At the time of the appeal, the named 
plaintiffs’ immigration statuses were as follows: 
• Plaintiff Jie Fang appeared before an immigration court, 
which issued a voluntary departure order on March 8, 
2017. He departed the United States on March 31, 2017 
and had not yet applied for reinstatement. 
 
• Plaintiff Shaofu Li was placed in removal proceedings 
but subsequently departed the United States on April 4, 
2017, resulting in the termination of his removal 
proceedings in June 2017. He also applied for 
reinstatement to attend the Harrisburg University of 
Science & Technology, but that application was denied 
                                              
29 Fang v. Homan, No. 17-2092, 2017 WL 6453466 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 2, 2017). 
30 Id. at *2. 
31 Id. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at *3. 
34 Id. 
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by USCIS because, among other reasons, he failed to 
respond to USCIS’s request for evidence.  
 
• Plaintiff Hirenkumar Patel applied for reinstatement to 
attend the Harrisburg University of Science & 
Technology, and that application was denied by USCIS 
in January 2018 because, in his reinstatement filing, he 
“asserted that [he] began attending online classes at 
UNNJ in June 2015.” Because “UNNJ conducted no 
courses of study, held no classes of any kind, and 
required no coursework of its students” his “statement 
to the contrary constitute[d] a willful misrepresentation 
of material fact in pursuit of an immigration benefit,” 
which USCIS considered “a very serious factor which 
weighs against a favorable exercise of discretion.” H. 
Patel was placed in removal proceedings and had a 
hearing scheduled in the Newark immigration court in 
January 2019.  
 
• Plaintiff Kaushalkumar Patel applied for reinstatement 
to attend the Harrisburg University of Science & 
Technology and that application was denied by USCIS 
in December 2017 because, in his reinstatement filing, 
he “asserted that [he] began attending online classes at 
UNNJ in June 2015.” Because “UNNJ conducted no 
courses of study, held no classes of any kind, and 
required no coursework of its students” his “statement 
to the contrary constitute[d] a willful misrepresentation 
of material fact in pursuit of an immigration benefit,” 
which USCIS considered “a very serious factor which 
weighs against a favorable exercise of discretion.” Patel 
was placed in removal proceedings and had a hearing 
scheduled in the Philadelphia immigration court in 
October 2018.  
 
• Plaintiff Xiaoyu Zhang applied for reinstatement to 
attend the University of North Texas. That application 
was still pending before USCIS.   
 
D. “These students, as far as we are concerned, were the 
victims of fraud.” 
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We held argument on September 25, 2018. There, for 
the first time, the Government informed this Court that its 
position was not that the students had committed fraud by 
enrolling in UNNJ. Rather, the Government believed that the 
students were the victims of fraud. The Government twice 
stated that the students “were caught up in it in the sense that 
they were victim by the academic recruiters” 35 and that 
“[t]here was no fraud here. These students, as far as we are 
concerned, were the victims of fraud. . . .  [T]hey were caught 
up in it.”36 When pressed about the language in the terminating 
letter, the Government (incorrectly) stated that “fraudulent 
enrollment” was “passive voice,”37 and therefore should not be 
read to imply that the students had committed fraud. 
 
Despite the Government’s position that the students 
were the victims of fraud, it acknowledged that database 
entries for each student would reflect the “fraudulent 
enrollment” determination made by DHS. The Government 
acknowledged that it was able to, consistent with its stated 
position, eliminate any database notations that suggested that 
the students had committed fraud, yet it refused to do so.38 It 
argued that correcting the record on a preventive basis was not 
necessary because the “fraudulent enrollment” determination 
would not have any adverse impact on the students in future 
immigration proceedings.39 
 
On October 12, 2018, the Government changed course 
yet again. It filed a letter “to clear up any confusion from 
certain exchanges” that occurred during argument. The 
Government informed the Court that it was not, in fact, 
conceding “that all—or even most—UNNJ enrollees were 
innocent victims.”40 In fact, the Government now asserted that 
some of the students “in all likelihood, knew that their 
academic recruiters were committing visa fraud” and others 
even “conspired with their academic recruiters to commit visa 
                                              
35 Oral Arg. Tr., 23. 
36 Id. at 21. 
37 Id. at 25. 
38 Id. at 26, 28–29.  
39 Id. at 36. 
40 Letter, 1, Oct. 12, 2018. 
 
 12 
 
fraud.”41 “Thus,” the letter concluded, “to the extent that any 
of the Government’s comments at oral argument left the 
misimpression that all of UNNJ’s enrollees were innocent 
victims of the academic recruiters’ visa fraud scheme, that is 
not the case.”42  
I. DISCUSSION43 
A. Jurisdiction Under the Administrative Procedures Act 
 
Under the APA, “final agency action[s] for which there 
is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial 
review.”44 For an agency action to be final under the APA, the 
action must mark the “consummation” of the agency’s 
decision-making process, and the action must determine a 
“right[] or obligation[].”45 Here, the second condition is clearly 
satisfied. The termination order ended the student’s legal status 
in the United States.  However, the question of whether the 
action also marked the consummation of the agency’s 
decisionmaking process is not as clear.  
 
The appellants argue the termination of their status 
constituted a final order because ICE’s decisionmaking process 
                                              
41 Id. at 2. 
42 Id. 
43 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Although the District Court dismissed the case without 
prejudice, the appellants have stated that they cannot amend 
their complaint in order to cure the defect. Accordingly, the 
dismissal order is final. See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 
209, 219 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Although we generally do not 
exercise jurisdiction where a District Court dismisses a 
complaint without prejudice and grants leave to amend, such 
an order is final and reviewable under § 1291 where, as here, 
a party declares an intention to stand on the complaint.”) 
(internal citations omitted). Our standard of review for 
appeals challenging a district court’s decision about 
jurisdiction and ripeness is plenary. Marathon Petroleum 
Corp. v. Sec’y of Finance, 876 F.3d 481, 488 n.9 (3d Cir. 
2017) 
44 5 U.S.C. § 704.  
45 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (citations 
omitted). 
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is now complete. Their lawful F-1 student status has been 
stripped away from them and ICE has already determined that 
they fraudulently enrolled in UNNJ to obtain visas.46 The 
Government counters that the action is not final because the 
appellants have “avenues of recourse other than a lawsuit in 
federal court.”47  According to the Government, appellants can 
pursue either of two administrative avenues of relief.  First, the 
Government claims the UNNJ students may seek reinstatement 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(16). Second, it claims that an 
adverse reinstatement decision can be addressed during 
removal proceedings, which give the appellants the 
“opportunity to contest the grounds of their removal before an 
immigration judge (‘IJ’), with the opportunity to appeal any 
adverse decisions to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(‘BIA’), and from there to a court of appeals.”48 The District 
Court agreed with the Government’s first argument.  The Court 
held that the order was not final because reinstatement 
proceedings were pending. It did not address the argument 
about deportation proceedings.  
 
Finality in immigration proceedings is governed by our 
decision in Pinho v. Gonzales.49 There, Gummersindo Pinho, a 
native of Portugal who married a United States citizen, applied 
for an adjustment of his immigration status to “permanent 
resident.”50 The Immigration and Naturalization Service 
denied adjustment based on an eight-year-old narcotics 
conviction that had been vacated about two years prior to 
Pinho’s adjustment application.  Pinho then filed a complaint 
in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the denial 
of his adjustment of status was arbitrary, capricious, and 
unlawful because his previously vacated conviction should not 
have barred his eligibility for adjustment.51  The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Government for 
reasons that are not relevant to our inquiry.  
                                              
46 Br. for Appellant, 26–27.  
47 Br. for Appellees, 4. 
48 Id. 
49 432 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005). 
50 Pinho, 432 F.3d at 197. 
51 Id. at 198. 
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On appeal, we considered sua sponte whether the INS’s 
decision, which was ultimately affirmed by ICE’s 
Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”) constituted a final 
order for the purposes of APA jurisdiction. We began our 
discussion by reciting the Bennett test set forth above. We then 
noted that “[f]inality requires exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.”52 That is, if “there remain steps that the immigrant 
can take to have an action reviewed within the agency, then the 
action is not final and judicial review is premature.”53 We 
explained that this rule is derived from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Darby v. Cisneros.54  There, the Court “held that 
agency action is final when the ‘aggrieved party has exhausted 
all administrative remedies expressly prescribed by statute or 
agency rule.’”55  However, the Court limited the instances 
where an aggrieved litigant must appeal to “superior agency 
authority” before proceeding in federal court.56 The Court held 
that exhaustion of administrative remedies was “a prerequisite 
to judicial review only when expressly required by statute or 
when an administrative rule requires appeal before review and 
the administrative action is made inoperative pending that 
review.”57  
 
In Pinho’s case, we concluded that the AAO’s denial of 
his adjustment of status was a final order because “the agency 
offered no further procedures that Pinho could invoke to have 
his claim of statutory eligibility heard. There [was] no 
provision for BIA review of an AAO status-adjustment 
eligibility decision.”58 Put differently, “Pinho had no further 
opportunity to challenge the legality of the decision within the 
agency.”59 We also found that the possibility for Pinho to 
renew his application for change of status during deportation 
proceedings did not affect the finality of the agency’s actions. 
“The reason [was] simple: if the agency does not seek to deport 
                                              
52 Id. at 200. 
53 Id. 
54 509 U.S. 137 (1993). 
55 Pinho, 432 F.3d at 202 (quoting Darby, 509 U.S. at 146). 
56 Id. (quoting Darby, 509 U.S. at 154). 
57 Id. (quoting Darby, 509 U.S. at 154). 
58 Id. at 200. 
59 Id. at 201. 
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the immigrant, there can never be an appeal within the agency 
by which any higher level of administrative authority can be 
invoked to review the legal determination made by the 
AAO.”60 
 
Pinho’s holding is straightforward. A litigant aggrieved 
by an agency decision must seek review from a superior agency 
authority before bringing a claim in the district court “only 
when expressly required [to do so] by statute”61 and only when 
the statute sets forth “steps that the immigrant can take to have 
an action reviewed within the agency.”62 Thus, removal 
proceedings are not a prerequisite to finality when there is no 
guarantee that such a proceeding will ever occur. 
 
Following Pinho, the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth 
and Ninth Circuits expounded further on the concept of finality 
for the purposes of APA jurisdiction in the adjustment-of-
status context.63 In Cabaccang v. USCIS, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit considered whether a denial of status 
adjustment constituted a final order. However, unlike in Pinho, 
Cabaccang faced pending removal proceedings when his 
adjustment of status was denied. The court concluded that the 
denial of status adjustment was not final because the 
immigration judge overseeing the pending removal 
proceedings had the power to “completely wipe away [the] 
USCIS’s prior decision” to deny Cabaccang’s adjustment-of-
status request.64 The removal proceedings empowered the 
immigration judge to exercise de novo review over 
applications for adjustment of status.65 
 
In Hosseini v. Johnson, the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit adopted our reasoning in Pinho.66 In doing so, it 
                                              
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 202. 
62 Id. at 200. 
63 See Hosseini v. Johnson, 826 F.3d 354 (6th Cir. 2016); 
Cabaccang v. USCIS, 627 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 2010). 
64 Cabaccang, 627 F.3d at 1316. 
65 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.1(a)(1)(ii), 1245.2(a)(1)(i)). 
66 See Hosseini, 826 F.3d at 361 (finding Pinho “particularly 
instructive”).  
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rejected the Government’s argument that the applicant, who 
was denied adjustment of status, could “merely reapply for 
admission as often as he wants.”67 The Sixth Circuit held that 
the Government’s position that Hosseini could “simply ‘try 
again’ fails to appreciate that even if [he] receive[d] four or 
five denials, he would never receive meaningful review of any 
of them.”68 That is, there could “never be an appeal within the 
agency by which any higher level of administrative authority 
[could] be invoked to review the legal determination” made by 
the USCIS.69 The same is true here.  
 
The order terminating these students’ F-1 visas marked 
the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process, 
and is therefore a final order, for two reasons. First, there is no 
statutory  or regulatory requirement that a student seek 
reinstatement after his or her F-1 visa has been terminated. 
Moreover, even if the students attempt to pursue the 
administrative procedures for reinstatement, there is no 
mechanism to review the propriety of the original termination 
order.  Second, the students need not wait for removal 
proceedings to be instituted. As we stated in Pinho, an order’s 
finality cannot depend on the institution of removal procedures 
which may never occur. And in any event, immigration judges 
cannot review the original denial of reinstatement. They do not 
have that authority.  We explain each aspect of our holding in 
turn. 
 
First, we disagree with the District Court’s conclusion 
that the order is not final because the students are either seeking 
reinstatement or could seek reinstatement in the future. 
Nothing in the Immigration and Nationality Act70 or the Code 
of Federal Regulations requires a nonimmigrant whose visa 
has been terminated to seek reinstatement as a form of 
review.71 The reinstatement regulation itself notes only that a 
student “may not appeal” an unsuccessful attempt at 
                                              
67 Id. at 362. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 361 (quoting Pinho, 432 F.3d at 201). 
70 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. 
71 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d). 
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reinstatement.72 In short, reinstatement is not “a prerequisite to 
judicial review.”73  It is neither “expressly required by statute” 
nor does “an[y] administrative rule require[] appeal before 
review and the administrative action is made inoperative 
pending that review.”74 
 
We similarly hold that reinstatement proceedings are 
not a prerequisite to finality because reinstatement is not a 
mechanism by which the students can obtain review of DHS’s 
decision to terminate their status for their alleged fraudulent 
enrollment.75 Despite the Government’s argument to the 
contrary, there is nothing in the reinstatement provisions that 
permit the USCIS to review a prior termination order issued by 
DHS. Rather, the former UNNJ students will first need to 
reenroll in another school76 and then demonstrate that they 
satisfy the remaining criteria for reinstatement.77 Even if the 
students are successfully reinstated by USCIS, they will have 
achieved that status without ever having undergone review of 
the initial termination and fraudulent enrollment decision. 
Accordingly, reinstatement does not provide an opportunity to 
“completely wipe away” a prior agency decision.78 Nor does it 
provide a step that “the immigrant can take to have an action 
reviewed within the agency.”79 
 
We also disagree with the District Court’s conclusion 
that terminating the students’ status was akin to “an initial 
administrative action that begins an investigation,” and 
therefore was not final.80 The Government relies on this 
                                              
72 Id. § 214.2(f)(16)(ii). 
73 Pinho, 432 F.3d at 202 (quoting Darby, 509 U.S. at 154). 
74 Id. 
75 Given the Government’s vacillation on the issue, we take 
no position on whether the students fraudulently enrolled in 
UNNJ.  
76 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(16)(i) (requiring a “DSO’s 
recommendation for reinstatement”). 
77 Id. § 214.2(f)(16)(i)(A)-(F). 
78 Cabaccang, 627 F.3d at 1316.  
79 Pinho, 432 F.3d at 200.  
80 Fang, 2017 WL 6453466, at *2 (citing FTC v. Standard Oil 
Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 239 (1980)). 
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position on appeal, and attempts to analogize this situation to 
cases involving, for example, termination of asylum.81 The 
asylum cancellation statutes illustrate why the termination in 
this case is final as opposed to the “termination of asylum 
[which] does not consummate agency action and thus is not 
final.”82  
 
When the Government terminates asylum status, it must 
necessarily initiate removal proceedings.83  During those 
proceedings, the former asylee may contest the termination in 
front of an immigration judge and/or reapply for asylum.84 The 
provisions regarding termination of F-1 status contain no such 
analogous requirement that the Government initiate removal 
proceedings. Indeed, as the Government concedes, some of the 
plaintiffs here have yet to have removal proceedings initiated 
against them even after their F-1 status had been set to 
“terminated.”  Unlike the situation with asylees, each student’s 
status was terminated without any proceedings ever being 
initiated.  That clearly distinguishes the students’ procedural 
path from that of an ex-asylee. Accordingly, we hold that the 
termination of the students’ F-1 visa status in the manner that 
occurred here is not akin to the initiation of the agency’s 
decisionmaking process.  Rather, it is the culmination of that 
process. 
 
Second, we disagree with the Government’s contention 
that the agency’s action is not final because the students can 
obtain review of any denial of reinstatement during removal 
proceedings. This argument fails for two reasons. First, as we 
stated in Pinho, the finality of an order cannot be conditioned 
on something that may never happen. Accordingly, as we held 
in Pinho, uninitiated removal proceedings cannot be a 
prerequisite to finality when there is no guarantee that such 
proceedings will ever occur.  Moreover, we do not agree with 
                                              
81 See Br. for Appellee, 23–24.  
82 Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 779 (5th Cir. 2011). 
83 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (“[I]n the case of an [asylum] 
applicant who appears to be  . . . deportable . . . the asylum 
officer shall refer the application to an immigration judge . . . 
for adjudication in removal proceedings[.]”); see also, 
generally, Kashani v. Nelson, 793 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1986).  
84 Qureshi, 663 F.3d at 780. 
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any suggestion that a student is not really harmed if no removal 
proceedings ever occur.  We therefore reject any such claim as 
bearing on our finality inquiry. It is highly unlikely that any 
student will simply be allowed to remain here. Moreover, even 
if that were to happen, we do not think that any such students 
should be forced to permanently endure remaining here with 
the threat of imminent removal and all of its attendant 
circumstances permanently hanging over their heads.   
 
Second, removal proceedings do not offer an 
opportunity for review of the denial of reinstatement. Although 
we have never addressed the issue precedentially,85 both the 
BIA86 and our sister circuit courts of appeals87 have held that 
removal proceedings cannot function as review mechanisms 
for reinstatement proceedings.  
 
In Young Dong Kim v. Holder, a nonimmigrant 
student’s F-1 status was terminated and the USCIS denied the 
petition to reinstate.88  Eventually, DHS issued a Notice to 
Appear and initiated deportation proceedings.89 When Ko (the 
former F-1 visa holder) attempted to challenge the denial of 
reinstatement the IJ “noted that he lacked the authority to 
reinstate Ko’s student status because the decision was within 
the sole discretion of the USCIS.”90  On administrative appeal, 
the BIA also found “that neither the IJ nor the BIA have the 
authority to review the decision by USCIS denying Ko’s 
application to reinstate her student status.”91 When Ko 
eventually appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, that court held that the IJ and the BIA may not “review 
                                              
85 See Laoye v. Attorney General, 352 F. App’x 714, 717 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  
86 See, e.g., Matter of Yazdani, 17 I.&N. Dec. 626, 628–29 
(BIA 1981). 
87 See, e.g., Young Dong Kim v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1181 (7th 
Cir. 2013); Ghorbani v. INS, 686 F.2d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 
1982); Tooloee v. INS, 722 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir. 1983). 
88 Kim, 737 F.3d at 1182. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 1183. 
91 Id. at 1184. 
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the USCIS’s discretionary denial of a motion to reinstate 
student status.”92 
 
Similarly, in Tooloee v. INS, both an immigration judge 
and the BIA refused to reexamine the USCIS District 
Director’s decision to deny Tooloee’s request for 
reinstatement.93 The IJ found that it was without authority to 
review the claim,94 and the BIA agreed. On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “the immigration 
judge and the BIA, in refusing to review the District Director’s 
decision, correctly interpreted their jurisdictional 
regulations.”95 Tooloee noted that the agency regulations 
explicitly stated that there shall be no appeal from the District 
Director’s decision, and it was therefore not unreasonable for 
another agency to find that it had no authority to re-examine 
the District Director’s decision.96 
 
We therefore hold that removal proceedings cannot 
serve as an opportunity to review the USCIS’s denial of 
reinstatement because neither immigration judges nor the BIA 
have jurisdiction to review those decisions.  Our decision is 
dictated by the Code of Federal Regulations,97 and is consistent 
with decisions of the BIA98 and our sister circuit courts of 
appeals.99 We therefore reject the Government’s argument that 
the order terminating the appellants’ student status in this case 
is not final until after removal proceedings are instituted—a  
process which the Government contends must itself occur (if 
at all) only after denial of reinstatement. 
                                              
92 Id. at 1187. 
93 Tooloee, 722 F.2d at 1436. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(16)(ii) (stating that “if the USCIS does 
not reinstate the student, the student may not appeal its 
decision”). 
98 Matter of Yazdani, 17 I.&N. Dec. 626, 628–29 (BIA 1981). 
99 Young Dong Kim v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1181 (7th Cir. 2013); 
Ghorbani v. INS, 686 F.2d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1982); Tooloee 
v. INS, 722 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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In sum, we hold that reinstatement proceedings neither 
are required by statute or regulation nor afford the students an 
opportunity for review of DHS’s decision to terminate their F-
1 visa status and therefore are not a prerequisite to finality for 
the purposes of our subject matter jurisdiction under the APA. 
Similarly, the students need not wait until removal proceedings 
are instituted to challenge the termination of their student 
status.  Since neither immigration judges nor the BIA have the 
authority to overturn the USCIS’s denial of reinstatement, 
those proceedings do not offer the students an opportunity to 
contest agency action. The order terminating the students’ F-1 
visa status was therefore a final order for jurisdictional 
purposes because there was no further opportunity for 
review.100 
B. Ripeness 
 
We also disagree with the District Court’s conclusion 
that this case is not ripe for review.  Ripeness is a justiciability 
doctrine that derives from Article III of the United States 
Constitution.101 “The function of the ripeness doctrine is to 
determine whether a party has brought an action 
prematurely[.]”102 The doctrine counsels that we should 
abstain “until such time as a dispute is sufficiently concrete to 
                                              
100 And it is easy to see why the students desire review—DHS 
appears to have terminated their F-1 visas without the 
statutory authority to do so. As discussed above, the ability to 
terminate an F-1 visa is limited by § 214.1(d).  That provision 
states: “(d) Termination of status. Within the period of initial 
admission or extension of stay, the nonimmigrant status of an 
alien shall be terminated by the revocation of a waiver 
authorized on his or her behalf under section 212(d)(3) or (4) 
of the Act; by the introduction of a private bill to confer 
permanent resident status on such alien; or, pursuant to 
notification in the Federal Register, on the basis of national 
security, diplomatic, or public safety reasons.” 8 C.F.R. § 
214.1(d).  None of those mechanisms were employed in this 
case.  
101 Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 535 
(3d Cir. 1988). 
102 Peachlum v. City of York, 333 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 
2003) (citations omitted).  
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satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of the 
doctrine.”103 We have recognized the following considerations 
that underpin the ripeness doctrine: 
[A]re the parties in a sufficiently 
adversarial posture to be able to 
present their positions vigorously; 
are the facts of the case sufficiently 
developed to provide the court 
with enough information on which 
to decide the matter conclusively; 
and is a party genuinely aggrieved 
so as to avoid expenditure of 
judicial resources on matters 
which have caused harm to no 
one.104 
 
At bottom, the doctrine is inextricably tied to Article III’s 
requirement of a case or controversy.  It “requires that the 
challenge grow out of a ‘real, substantial controversy between 
parties’ involving a ‘dispute definite and concrete.’”105 
 
As previously discussed, the District Court found that 
ongoing reinstatement proceedings rendered this case unripe 
for review, “because Plaintiffs are seeking the same 
determination—whether their enrollments were fraudulent—
that they are already seeking from their pending 
[reinstatement] applications.”106 But, as we have just 
explained, the ongoing reinstatement proceedings do not 
provide an avenue to review ICE’s termination of the students’ 
F-1 visa status.  Given that procedural conundrum, the posture 
of this case satisfies all of the traditional factors that we have 
considered in a ripeness analysis.  
 
The parties are clearly sufficiently adversarial. The 
students are genuinely aggrieved after having their lawful 
status terminated and a notation of fraud placed on their 
                                              
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 433–34 (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal 
Jurisdiction § 2.3.1 (1989)).  
105 Id. at 434 (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l 
Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). 
106 See Fang, 2017 WL 6453466, at *3.  
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records, thereby permanently branding each of them with a 
Scarlett “F.”  The only consideration that could arguably give 
us pause is the Government’s shifting position on whether the 
students are the victims of fraud or themselves participants in 
the fraud for having come here to attend the nonexistent UNNJ. 
However, it would be a cruel irony indeed if we were to allow 
the Government’s own flip-flop on that characterization to 
deprive us of the ability to review the disputed governmental 
action, an action which, as we have explained, will almost 
certainly escape review absent an exercise of Article III 
jurisdiction.  Rather than allow the Government’s change in 
position to inure to the Government’s own benefit, we believe 
the flip-flop underscores the need for judicial review of a 
decision that would otherwise escape review by any court or 
agency.  
 
There may ultimately be issues that arise here as the 
record develops that weigh in favor of proceeding cautiously. 
For example, there will likely be a formidable challenge to this 
case’s amenability for class disposition because even the 
named plaintiffs appear to be in starkly different positions. But 
none of those issues will become more crystallized at a later 
date, absent an opportunity develop the record and none of the 
collateral challenges will result in review of ICE’s decision to 
terminate the students’ status for purportedly fraudulent 
enrollment.  We therefore hold that this case, as currently 
comprised, is ripe for review and will remand to the District 
Court so that this record can be developed.107 
II. CONCLUSION 
  
For the foregoing reasons, the order dismissing this case is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
                                              
107 Although we have commented on potential issues 
surrounding the composition of this class, we take no position 
on the propriety of pursing these claims as a class action. We 
have alluded to theoretical issues of class certification merely 
in the context of our discussion of the ripeness doctrine and 
nothing we have said herein should be taken as controlling or 
influencing the District Court in any subsequent inquiry under 
Rule 23.  
